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In past years, it became clear to philosophers of science that models are crucial tools for understanding 
and predicting complex phenomena. Recently, works at the intersection of philosophy and history of 
science looked at philosophy of history and at the discussions on the explanatory role of narratives 
(Little 2017; Roth 1989; Mink 1978) for a more inclusive account of explanation (Morgan 2017a, 2017b, 
Currie and Sterelny 2017, Beatty 2017). In this paper, we argue that the application of the concept of 
narrative to the analysis of scientific models provides some new epistemic tools for the integration of 
history and philosophy of science. 
 
Philosophers of science are beginning to look at the philosophy of history for a definition of what counts 
as narrative (Morgan 2017a). Following the suggestion of philosophers of history, narratives should be 
explanatory in virtue of their very structure (Roth 1989). We use narrative studies as a springboard to 
ask how models produce “assertions” on aspects of the world despite their non-compliance with major 
requirements of first-order logic (Roth 1989). Differently to scientific theories, which the received view 
defined as sets of truth-apt propositions in a formal language. 
 Models are not strictly speaking true or false. Nonetheless, models produce particular kinds of 
“assertions” about the target systems they represent, which do not substitute or invalidate the 
propositional type of assertions made by scientific theories; rather, they enrich the knowledge that 
theories afford with context-based, case specific circumstances. Morgan (2017b) and Beatty (2017), 
among others, recently focused on finding narrative structures that would prove particularly useful in 
scientific explanation. We presently expand on their account of narrative explanation and apply what we 
consider to be key features of narrative structures to the analysis of scientific models. Our case study is 
the San Francisco Bay Model (SFBM), a hydraulic scale model built to study the effects of a plan to dam 
up the San Francisco Bay proposed by John Reber in the late 40s (Weisberg 2013:2). This model testifies 
for a “revolution” in the history of hydraulic engineering, since it changed the approach of both 
scientists and lay people to a scientific question of extreme relevance for the San Francisco community. 
At the same time, the SFBM invites philosophers of science to give a closer look at the kind of 
“assertions” that the model produced. By integrating narratives in an account of models, we aim to cast 
new light on the non-deductive explanatory function of models. 
 
We start from Roth’s challenge to identify explanation as a product of the very structures that constitute 
narrative (Roth 1989) and isolate three narrative structures with explanatory value: (1) 
colligation/juxtaposition (Morgan 2017b), (2) belief/expectation, and (3) doubt/surprise. The two terms 
defining each narrative structure are often used together and may be used to capture slightly different 
meanings. “Colligation” (1) is a term famous to philosophers of science thanks to William Whewell 
(1794-1866), who in his The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded Upon Their History ([1840] 
1847: 46-48) uses colligation as a technique for discovery. (2) and (3) are both introduced by Charles 
Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), in his 1877 “The Fixation of Belief”: we discuss them as providing the 
context for a meaningful application of colligation or juxtaposition. Once some narrative structures are 
clearly defined, we ask what they may be particularly good at. Beatty (2017: 31) suggests that narratives 
provide stricter constraints than first-order logic for judgements over possibilities: what is “‘historically,’ 
‘narrative’ possible” is much more much narrowly defined than what is “just logically or physically 
possible;” we maintain that the “historically possible” does not necessarily constitute a subset of the 
logically possible either and may contain radically surprising features, i.e. features that could not be 
deduced a priori from the initial conditions. Again, models – especially physical ones – offer strong 
evidence for the possibility of such a radical surprise (Rouse 1950: 138; Morgan 2012: 34). To sum up, 
we see narratives as (1) knitting particular facts together in a way that theories cannot do (via 
colligation), (2) exploring contingent possibilities and giving contingent explanations for contingent 
events, (3) at the same time attaining a kind of generality via the use of general structures (such as 
expectation and surprise). 
 
We can improve our understanding of scientific models by examining them in terms of the key features 
of narrative structure pointed out above. The San Francisco Bay Model (SFBM) is a physical scale model 
that denotes the San Francisco Bay and aims to selectively represent some behaviours of the water 
flows in the bay (U.S. Army Corps 1963; Huggins and Schultz 1967). With the help of a complex system of 
pipes and tanks, and the combination of different scales (1:1000 for the horizontal scale, 1:100 for the 
vertical scale, 10:1 for the slope, 1:100 for the time scale, etc.), the SFBM managed to knit numerous 
features of the Bay together in a coherent whole. Through colligation (1), scientists brought together a 
set of relevant parameters under an overall guiding conception (Morgan 2017b: 89). The SFBM was an 
exploratory tool insofar as it allowed engineers to investigate the consequences of different 
contingencies in the Bay. For instance, the model was used to study the possible effects of constructing 
barriers throughout the Bay (2). Lastly, the SFBM was a successful resource to integrate understanding 
of particular disrupting events (effects of barriers in the Bay) and general background phenomena (the 
behaviour of currents and tides in nature). In doing so, the SFBM was a material resource to make 
underlying beliefs explicit and to generate well-defined “doubts” (3). 
 
We see the application of narrative structures to model analysis as a contribution of historical methods 
to a problem in philosophy of science, and the philosophical analysis of models as a test-board for the 
validity of narrative claims. In this, history and philosophy of science are brought one step closer. 
 
REFERENCES 
Beatty, J., 2017, “Narrative Possibility and Narrative Explanation,” Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science, 62: 31-41. 
Currie, A., Sterelny, K., 2017, “In defence of story-telling,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 
62: 14-21. 
Huggins, E., and Schultz, E., 1967, “San Francisco Bay in a warehouse”. Journal of the IEST, 10(5), 9–16. 
Little, D., 2017, "Philosophy of History", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/history/> 
Morgan, M. S., 2012, The world in the model: how economists work and think. Cambridge University 
Press, 2012. 
–, 2017a, “Narrative science and narrative knowing. Introduction to special issue on 
narrative science,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 62: 1-5. 
–, 2017b, “Narrative ordering and explanation,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 62: 86-97. 
Mink, L., 1978, "Narrative form as a cognitive instrument." in The writing of history: Literary form and 
historical understanding. Robert H. Canary and Henry Kozicki, eds. Madison, Wisconsin: The University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1978. 
Peirce, C. S., [1877] 1992, “The Fixation of Belief,” The Essential Peirce. Selected Philosophical Writings, 
v. 1 (1867-1893), Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel eds., Bloomington and Indianopolis: Indiana 
University Press. 
Roth, P., 1989, “How Narratives Explain,” Social Research, 56 (2): 449-478. 
Rouse H., 1950, Engineering Hydraulics. Proceedings of the Fourth Hydraulics Conference. Iowa Institute 
of Hydraulic Research. June 12-15, 1949. 
Souloumiac, P., et al., 2012, “Bias due to side wall friction in sand box experiments”. Journal of 
Structural Geology 35 (2012) 90-101 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (1963). Technical report on barriers: A part of the comprehensive survey of 
San Francisco Bay and tributaries. California (Main report). San Francisco: Army Corps of Engineers. 
Whewell, W., [1840] 1847, The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded Upon Their History, 2nd 
edition, in two volumes, London: John W. Parker. 
 
